# Sealed buybacks on Peal

sealed buybacks

# the treasury buys back blind.

the problem a market buyback announces itself. a scheduled buy is the most predictable order on the chain, so bots trade ahead of it and into it, and a holder who wants to sell cannot name a price at all. they take whatever the pool pays at that moment.

what a sealed buyback does the treasury locks a budget onchain. holders lock the tokens they offer and seal the lowest price they would accept. at the close every offer opens at once, the cheapest fill first, and every seller is paid the same price.

[open the buyback desk](https://peal.network/#/buybacks) [start a buyback](https://peal.network/#/buybacks/new)

market buyback · todayevery order readable

bot 0xee…42buys first, same pool

treasury→pool

buy 50,000 PEALD every hour

schedule published in the governance forum

bot 0xee…42sells into the buy, pockets the spread

holder→pool

sells 40,000 into the pool. there is no field for the price they would accept

the schedule is public, so the trade is predictable read the schedule, traded around it

sealed buyback budget locked · offers sealedopened together

budget locked**100,000 DUSD**price cap 2.00

0x8f1c…a40e escrow 40,000 PEALD quantity ? · minimum ?

0x8f1c…a40e **40,000** PEALD · at least **1.00** sold 40,000 at 1.25

0x2b77…09d1 escrow 55,000 PEALD quantity ? · minimum ?

0x2b77…09d1 **40,000** PEALD · at least **1.25** sold 40,000 · 15,000 back

0xd03e…7c52 escrow 60,000 PEALD quantity ? · minimum ?

0xd03e…7c52 **60,000** PEALD · at least **1.75** kept every token

one price**1.25 DUSD**80,000 bought · budget spent

nothing to trade around, because there is nothing to read no offer was readable before the close

the front-runner is not slower. **there is no order to read.**

11

price every seller is paid, computed onchain from the opened book

02

offers anyone can read before the close, the treasury included

3 of 53

committee shares needed before any offer opens

¹ `TenderClearing.findClearing` · ² offers are encrypted in the seller's browser with batched threshold encryption · ³ the testnet committee's keys are published on purpose, see honest limits below

why it matters

## buybacks became the biggest recurring trade in crypto, and the least private

protocols now route a large share of their revenue into buying their own token back. almost all of it executes the same way: market buys on a schedule, from a known address, into a public pool.

[**$1.3B+**spent by the hyperliquid assistance fund buying hype on the open market, by october 2025_crypto.news_](https://crypto.news/why-hype-is-different-inside-hyperliquids-buyback/)[**$350M**spent by pump.fun on pump buybacks, now half of fees into a daily buy and burn_yahoo finance_](https://finance.yahoo.com/markets/crypto/articles/pump-fun-350-million-pump-210555552.html)[**$70M+**spent by jupiter in 2025, with its ceo weighing a pause over the price effect_stocktwits_](https://stocktwits.com/news-articles/markets/cryptocurrency/jupiter-ticks-higher-as-ceo-weighs-pausing-buybacks-after-70-m-spent-in-2025/cmxo41nR4Gj)[**up to $50M**a year approved for aave buybacks, executed weekly_the block_](https://www.theblock.co/post/375677/aave-dao-token-buyback-program-revenue-zeller-aci)

the precedent

### public companies solved this decades ago

a **modified dutch auction tender offer** lets shareholders name the price at which they would sell, inside a range the company sets. the company buys at the lowest single price that fills its target, and pays it to everyone it buys from. motorola solutions ran one for up to $2 billion in 2015, marathon petroleum for up to $4 billion in 2021, and wix bought back $1.6 billion of stock at one price of $92. a sealed buyback is that mechanism, onchain, with the offers sealed until the close so nobody can tender against anyone else's number.

figures as reported by the linked sources, 2025 to 2026. they show the size of the flow, not that any of it was front-run; we found no study that measures that.

the problem

## what a public buyback gives away

1

treasury→pool

buy 50,000 PEALD every hour

schedule published in the governance forum

### the buy is scheduled

predictable

a buyback that runs every hour, or every day, from a known address, is an order everyone can see coming. anyone can buy just before it and sell into it, and the treasury pays the difference.

when it buyson a public schedule

who can trade around itanyone watching

2

holder→pool

sells 40,000 into the pool. there is no field for the price they would accept

### holders cannot name a price

price taker

a holder who wants out sells into the pool at whatever it pays right now. there is no way to say "i would sell at 1.25 and not below", so the patient seller and the desperate one get the same deal.

what they would accept1.25

what they can expressnothing

3

bot 0xee…42front-runs the next tranche

### the treasury moves its own price

impact

every market buy pushes the price up against the next one. the treasury competes with itself, and the budget buys less with every block it spends in.

first buyat the pool price

every buy aftera little higher

the mechanism

## how a sealed buyback closes the book

1

budget**100,000 DUSD**

### the budget is locked first

escrowed

the treasury creates the buyback and funds it in the same transaction. no seller ever offers against money that is not already there, and once anyone has offered, the treasury cannot walk away.

budgetheld by the contract

cancel after offersrefused

2

0x8f1c…a40e escrow 40,000 PEALD quantity ? · minimum ?

0x8f1c…a40e **40,000** PEALD · at least **1.00**

### sellers seal a minimum

sealed

each holder encrypts their quantity, the lowest price they would accept and a random salt to the committee, in their own browser, with batched threshold encryption. onchain sits a commitment, the ciphertext hash, and the tokens they offered, locked so the offer is binding.

onchaina commitment and the escrow

the minimum pricenot published

3

reveal root

### everything opens at once

3 of 5

at the close the operators each publish a decryption share and a threshold of them opens the whole batch together. the committee signs one root over every offer, and the contract checks each opened offer against the commitment its seller posted. an offer that goes missing halts the buyback into refunds instead of moving the price.

a changed offervoided, disputable

a missing offerhalts settlement

4

clearing price

### cheapest first, one price

verifiable

offers are sorted by minimum price and the price climbs from the lowest, as long as the budget can still pay every cheaper seller. where the budget runs out, the offers at that price share what is left. every seller filled is paid the same price, never less than they asked, and payouts never exceed the budget.

sellers are paidone clearing price

total paidat most the budget

simulator

## run a buyback before you run one

pick a book or write your own, set the budget and the ladder, then play the close. every number below is computed by `clearTender`, the rule the contract runs, in the same integer arithmetic.

buyback simulator same clearing rule as the contract

 

six holders spread across the ladder. the budget runs out partway up.

sellerquantityminimum

_PEALD_

 

_PEALD_

 

_PEALD_

 

_PEALD_

 

_PEALD_

 

_PEALD_

 

 

**alice**0xabc6f1…

**alice**200 · ≥ 1.00_sold all 200_

**bob**0xe34140…

**bob**300 · ≥ 1.10_sold all 300_

**carol**0x1abb90…

**carol**250 · ≥ 1.20_sold all 250_

**dan**0x5235df…

**dan**400 · ≥ 1.30_sold 19 of 400_

**erin**0x89b02e…

**erin**150 · ≥ 1.50_kept every token_

**frank**0xc12a7d…

**frank**500 · ≥ 1.80_kept every token_

one price**1.30**_DUSD for every seller filled_

bought**769**_PEALD_

spent**999.70**_of 1,000.00_

returned**0.30**_DUSD back to the treasury_

sellers filled**4/6**_1 rationed_

payouts pull-based, anyone can trigger, money only goes to its owner

seller

offer

sold PEALD

paid DUSD

back

alicefilled

200 ≥ 1.00

200

260.00

0

bobfilled

300 ≥ 1.10

300

390.00

0

carolfilled

250 ≥ 1.20

250

325.00

0

danpartial

400 ≥ 1.30

19

24.70

381

erinkept

150 ≥ 1.50

0

0.00

150

frankkept

500 ≥ 1.80

0

0.00

500

treasury

budget 1,000.00

+769

\-999.70

0.30 DUSD

the same 999.70 DUSD, three ways model

sealed buyback

**769** PEALD_at 1.30 each_

market buy

**703** PEALD_avg 1.42, 5.3% over spot_

market, sandwiched

**670** PEALD_bot keeps 46.01 DUSD_

constant-product pool with the 0.3% fee, 20,000 DUSD deep at 1.35; the sandwich front-runs with half the spend. a sealed buyback buys only from holders who chose to sell, at a price they named, and never touches the pool. if holders ask more than the pool, the pool is cheaper, and this shows that too.

happy with the numbers? start this buyback for real on Tempo testnet, with free test tokens.

[run this on testnet](https://peal.network/#/buybacks/new)

compared

## four ways to buy back a token

sealed buyback

market buy

scheduled twap

otc desk

the order before it executes

sealed until the close

in the mempool

schedule is public

seen by the desk

holders name their own price

every holder

no

no

large holders, privately

treasury moves its own price

no, clears off the pool

yes, into the pool

yes, a little each time

pays the desk spread

one price for every seller

yes

no

no

negotiated deal by deal

allocation anyone can check

recomputed from the opened book

transaction history

transaction history

trust the desk

budget committed up front

locked onchain

no

no

by contract

a private rpc hides a market buy from the public mempool, but not the schedule, the address or the pool it lands in, and a holder still cannot name a price.

who it serves

## three people, one tender

the treasury

buys back without announcing an order the market can trade against.

1.  sets a budget, a price range and a window
2.  locks the budget in the transaction that creates the buyback
3.  receives every token bought and the unspent budget, settled by contract

the holder

sells at a price they chose, or keeps every token.

1.  locks the tokens they would sell and seals the least they would accept
2.  learns nothing about other offers, and reveals nothing about theirs
3.  is paid the one clearing price, never below their minimum, or gets the tokens back

the governance voter

approves a budget and a cap, not a trading desk.

1.  votes the budget and the most the treasury will pay
2.  sees every offer after the close, with its commitment
3.  recomputes the clearing price from the opened book and checks it matches the chain

use cases

## before, and now

### fee-funded buybacks

before

protocols route fees into scheduled market buys. the schedule is public, so the order flow is the most predictable trade on the chain, and anyone can position ahead of it.

now

the treasury posts a budget and a window. holders who want to sell name their price privately, and the whole book clears once, off the pool, at one price.

### dao treasury rebalancing

before

a dao votes in public to buy its token back. the vote is the announcement, and the market reprices before the first purchase.

now

the vote approves a budget and a price cap. what each holder would accept stays sealed until the close, so the cap is the only number the market sees.

### unlock and vesting exits

before

large holders sell over weeks through market makers, each sale visible on chain, while the project watches the price absorb it.

now

the project offers to buy a fixed amount at the close. holders who want out sell into the tender; nobody who wants to stay is affected, and nobody reads anyone else’s offer.

the cryptography

## what is sealed, and what is not

sealed until the close

-   each seller's **minimum price** and exact **quantity**, encrypted with batched threshold encryption, the construction from [eprint 2026/760](https://eprint.iacr.org/2026/760) by the commonware team, used unmodified.
-   the **salt**, which rides inside the ciphertext, so a seller keeps nothing that has to survive until the close.
-   the **clearing price**, which does not exist until the book opens.

public from the start

-   the **budget**, the **price cap** and the **window**. the treasury chooses them, and sellers need them to decide.
-   each seller's **address** and **escrow**. the escrow bounds the quantity from above; a seller can lock more than they offer to blur it, and gets the surplus back.
-   after the close, **every offer**, so anyone can recompute the price.

honest limits

## what this does not do

live

**a testnet demo with tokens that have no value.** PEALD and DUSD come from a faucet. the testnet committee's keys are derivable on purpose, so treat every seal here as a demonstration of the mechanism.

live

**the treasury cannot sell to itself from its own address, and that is all.** it could offer through another address, as any seller could. nothing here detects that.

live

**prices sit on a ladder.** a minimum is one of at most 256 steps, so the hidden value is one of a known set. sealing stops anyone reading it, not guessing at it.

build

**the reveal root is signed, not verified onchain.** the contract trusts a threshold of committee signatures over the opened book rather than checking the decryption shares itself. what it does check is every opened offer against its seller's commitment.

questions

## what people ask first

how is the price chosen?

offers are sorted by minimum price. the price climbs from the lowest while the budget can still pay every cheaper seller at it. where the budget runs out, the offers at that price share what is left pro rata. nobody is paid below their minimum and the total paid never exceeds the budget.

can the treasury read the offers before the close?

no. each offer is encrypted in the seller's browser with batched threshold encryption and opens only when a threshold of operators publish decryption shares at the close. on testnet the committee keys are published, so treat that as a demonstration.

what if not enough holders want to sell?

everyone who offered within the cap fills, the price stops at the dearest offer that filled, and the rest of the budget goes back to the treasury in the same settlement.

what stops a fake low offer from setting the price?

every offer is backed by the tokens it offers, locked when it is made. an offer that is not fully backed is excluded at the reveal and refunded, so it can never move the price.

what if the committee misbehaves?

it cannot change an offer: each opened offer is checked against the commitment its seller posted, and a seller whose offer was swapped can prove it and halt the buyback into refunds. if an offer goes missing, settlement refuses to run, and after the deadline everyone is refunded.

is my offer size private?

not fully. the tokens you lock are a visible transfer and bound your quantity from above. you can lock more than you offer to blur it and get the surplus back. your minimum price is what stays sealed.

why not a twap through a private rpc?

a private rpc keeps one transaction out of the public mempool. it does not hide a schedule, stop the treasury moving its own pool, or give a holder any way to name a price.

## seal now. sell together.

start a buyback with test funds, or sell into one that is open.

[open the buyback desk](https://peal.network/#/buybacks)

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Source: https://peal.network/buyback
